The World Health Organization's Disease Outbreak News: A retrospective database

The World Health Organization (WHO) notifies the global community about disease outbreaks through the Disease Outbreak News (DON). These online reports tell important stories about both outbreaks themselves and the high-level decision making that governs information sharing during public health emergencies. However, they have been used only minimally in global health scholarship to date. Here, we collate all 2,789 of these reports from their first use through the start of the Covid-19 pandemic (January 1996 to December 2019), and develop an annotated database of the subjective and often inconsistent information they contain. We find that these reports are dominated by a mix of persistent worldwide threats (particularly influenza and cholera) and persistent epidemics (like Ebola virus disease in Africa or MERS-CoV in the Middle East), but also document important periods in history like the anthrax bioterrorist attacks at the turn of the century, the spread of chikungunya and Zika virus to the Americas, or even recent lapses in progress towards polio elimination. We present three simple vignettes that show how researchers can use these data to answer both qualitative and quantitative questions about global outbreak dynamics and public health response. However, we also find that the retrospective value of these reports is visibly limited by inconsistent reporting (e.g., of disease names, case totals, mortality, and actions taken to curtail spread). We conclude that sharing a transparent rubric for which outbreaks are considered reportable, and adopting more standardized formats for sharing epidemiological metadata, might help make the DON more useful to researchers and policymakers.

Urban pandemic response: Survey results describing the experiences from twenty-five cities during the COVID-19 pandemic

Since first being detected in Wuhan, China in late December 2019, COVID-19 has demanded a response from all levels of government. While the role of local governments in routine public health functions is well understood–and the response to the pandemic has highlighted the importance of involving local governments in the response to and management of large, multifaceted challenges–their role in pandemic response remains more undefined. Accordingly, to better understand how local governments in cities were involved in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted a survey involving cities in the Partnership for Healthy Cities to: (i) understand which levels of government were responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select pandemic response activities;(ii) document when response activities were implemented;(iii) characterize how challenging response activities were;and (iv) query about future engagement in pandemic and epidemic preparedness. Twenty-five cities from around the world completed the survey and we used descriptive statistics to summarize the urban experience in pandemic response. Our results show that national authorities were responsible and accountable for a majority of the activities considered, but that local governments were also responsible and accountable for key activities–especially risk communication and coordinating with community-based organizations and civil society organizations. Further, most response activities were implemented after COVID-19 had been confirmed in a city, many pandemic response activities proved to be challenging for local authorities, and nearly all local authorities envisioned being more engaged in pandemic preparedness and response following the COVID-19 pandemic. This descriptive research represents an important contribution to an expanding evidence base focused on improving the response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future outbreaks.

How do local-level authorities engage in epidemic and pandemic preparedness activities and coordinate with higher levels of government? Survey results from 33 cities

The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that there are opportunities to improve preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks. While much attention has been given to understanding national-level preparedness, relatively little attention has been given to understanding preparedness at the local-level. We, therefore, aim to describe (1) how local governments in urban environments were engaged in epidemic preparedness efforts before the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) how they were coordinating with authorities at higher levels of governance before COVID-19. We developed a survey and distributed it to 50 cities around the world involved in the Partnership for Healthy Cities. The survey included several question formats including free-response, matrices, and multiple-choice questions. RACI matrices, a project management tool that helps explain coordination structures, were used to understand the level of government responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select preparedness activities. We used descriptive statistics to summarize local-level engagement in preparedness. Local authorities from 33 cities completed the survey. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 20 of the cities had completed infectious disease risk assessments, 10 completed all-hazards risk assessments, 11 completed simulation exercises, 10 completed after-action reviews, 19 developed preparedness and response plans, three reported involvement in their country's Joint External Evaluation of the International Health Regulations, and eight cities reported involvement in the development of their countries' National Action Plan for Health Security. RACI matrices revealed various models of epidemic preparedness, with responsibility often shared across levels, and national governments accountable for the most activities, compared to other governance levels. In conclusion, national governments maintain the largest role in epidemic and pandemic preparedness but the role of subnational and local governments is not negligible. Local-level actors engage in a variety of preparedness activities and future efforts should strive to better include these actors in preparedness as a means of bolstering local, national, and global health security.

Urban pandemic response: Survey results describing the experiences from twenty-five cities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since first being detected in Wuhan, China in late December 2019, COVID-19 has demanded a response from all levels of government. While the role of local governments in routine public health functions is well understood-and the response to the pandemic has highlighted the importance of involving local governments in the response to and management of large, multifaceted challenges-their role in pandemic response remains more undefined. Accordingly, to better understand how local governments in cities were involved in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted a survey involving cities in the Partnership for Healthy Cities to: (i) understand which levels of government were responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select pandemic response activities; (ii) document when response activities were implemented; (iii) characterize how challenging response activities were; and (iv) query about future engagement in pandemic and epidemic preparedness. Twenty-five cities from around the world completed the survey and we used descriptive statistics to summarize the urban experience in pandemic response. Our results show that national authorities were responsible and accountable for a majority of the activities considered, but that local governments were also responsible and accountable for key activities-especially risk communication and coordinating with community-based organizations and civil society organizations. Further, most response activities were implemented after COVID-19 had been confirmed in a city, many pandemic response activities proved to be challenging for local authorities, and nearly all local authorities envisioned being more engaged in pandemic preparedness and response following the COVID-19 pandemic. This descriptive research represents an important contribution to an expanding evidence base focused on improving the response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future outbreaks.

An early analysis of the World Bank's Pandemic Fund: a new fund for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.

In response to shortcomings in epidemic preparedness and response that were revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been numerous proposals for ways to improve preparedness and response financing. Included among these is the World Bank's Pandemic Fund, formerly known as the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response, which was launched in September 2022. This analysis piece examines the Pandemic Fund, where it fits into ongoing discussions surrounding financing for preparedness and response efforts and discusses emerging apprehensions about the new financing mechanism. Briefly, the Pandemic Fund is not the first time that the World Bank has hosted a financing mechanism to provide support for pandemic response. Notably the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF)-which was launched in 2017 and closed in 2021-was criticised for generally failing to realise its potential. However, the Pandemic Fund seems to be addressing several of these critiques by placing a greater emphasis on prevention and preparedness financing, as opposed to response financing. Still, there is an important need for response funding mechanisms, and concerningly, the Pandemic Fund seems to support response efforts in name only. While it is clearly desirable to prepare for and prevent outbreaks for a multitude of reasons, it is also naive to assume that strengthening preparedness capacities will eliminate outbreaks and the need for response financing altogether. Accordingly, there is a need to complement this new financing mechanism with dedicated funding for responding to infectious disease outbreaks and to closely link this response financing with health security frameworks and instruments.

How do local-level authorities engage in epidemic and pandemic preparedness activities and coordinate with higher levels of government? Survey results from 33 cities.

The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that there are opportunities to improve preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks. While much attention has been given to understanding national-level preparedness, relatively little attention has been given to understanding preparedness at the local-level. We, therefore, aim to describe (1) how local governments in urban environments were engaged in epidemic preparedness efforts before the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) how they were coordinating with authorities at higher levels of governance before COVID-19. We developed a survey and distributed it to 50 cities around the world involved in the Partnership for Healthy Cities. The survey included several question formats including free-response, matrices, and multiple-choice questions. RACI matrices, a project management tool that helps explain coordination structures, were used to understand the level of government responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select preparedness activities. We used descriptive statistics to summarize local-level engagement in preparedness. Local authorities from 33 cities completed the survey. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 20 of the cities had completed infectious disease risk assessments, 10 completed all-hazards risk assessments, 11 completed simulation exercises, 10 completed after-action reviews, 19 developed preparedness and response plans, three reported involvement in their country's Joint External Evaluation of the International Health Regulations, and eight cities reported involvement in the development of their countries' National Action Plan for Health Security. RACI matrices revealed various models of epidemic preparedness, with responsibility often shared across levels, and national governments accountable for the most activities, compared to other governance levels. In conclusion, national governments maintain the largest role in epidemic and pandemic preparedness but the role of subnational and local governments is not negligible. Local-level actors engage in a variety of preparedness activities and future efforts should strive to better include these actors in preparedness as a means of bolstering local, national, and global health security.

COVID-19 and the proliferation of urban networks for health security.

Recent years have witnessed cities establishing themselves as major players in addressing global issues, often taking collective action through international city networks and organizations. These networks are important, as they amplify the voices of municipal officials, who are often excluded from high-level decision-making, and can also provide a platform for officials from low- or middle-income nations to participate in higher-level political forums. The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic has included traditional public health stakeholders-including supranational organizations, international non-governmental organizations and national authorities-but has also featured mayors and city networks, in an unprecedented fashion. Existing networks without an explicit focus on health have shifted their focuses to prioritize pandemic response and several new networks have been created. These developments are significant, not only because they represent a shift in health governance and policy, but also because cities and urban networks more broadly have exhibited a nimbleness and pragmatism unmatched by higher levels of governance. These characteristics could prove beneficial for addressing the current pandemic, as well as future health issues and emergencies. Furthermore, given the relative lack of engagement with health security issues before the COVID-19 pandemic, the drastic health and economic impacts associated with it, and the demonstrable value added by strong city leadership, there are an open policy window and a compelling case for continued city engagement in health security.

Global Fund contributions to health security in ten countries, 2014-20: mapping synergies between vertical disease programmes and capacities for preventing, detecting, and responding to public health emergencies.

BACKGROUND: The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is a robust vertical global health programme. The extent to which vertical programmes financially support health security has not been investigated. We, therefore, endeavoured to quantify the extent to which the budgets of this vertical programme support health security. We believe this is a crucial area of work as the global community works to combine resources for COVID-19 response and future pandemic preparedness. METHODS: We examined budgets for work in Kenya, Uganda, Vietnam, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone from January, 2014 to December, 2020. These ten countries were selected because of the robustness of investments and the availability of data. Using the International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool as a framework, we mapped budget line items to health security capacities. Two researchers independently reviewed each budget and mapped items to the JEE. Budgets were then jointly reviewed until a consensus was reached regarding if an item supported health security directly, indirectly, or not at all. The budgets for the study countries were inputted into a single Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and line items that mapped to JEE indicators were scaled up to their respective JEE capacity. Descriptive analyses were then done to determine the total amount of money budgeted for activities that support health security, how much was budgeted for each JEE capacity, and how much of the support was direct or indirect. FINDINGS: The research team reviewed 37 budgets. Budgets totalled US$6 927 284 966, and $2 562 063 054 (37·0%) of this mapped to JEE capacities. $1 330 942 712 (19·2%) mapped directly to JEE capacities and $1 231 120 342 (17·8%) mapped indirectly to JEE capacities. Laboratory systems, antimicrobial resistance, and the deployment of medical countermeasures and personnel received the most overall budgetary support; laboratory systems, antimicrobial resistance, and workforce development received the greatest amount of direct budgetary support. INTERPRETATION: Over one-third of the Global Fund's work also supports health security and the organisation has budgeted more than $2 500 000 000 for activities that support health security in ten countries since 2014. Although these funds were not budgeted specifically for health security purposes, recognising how vertical programmes can synergistically support other global health efforts has important implications for policy related to health systems strengthening. FUNDING: Resolve to Save Lives: An Initiative of Vital Strategies.

Rapid urban health security assessment tool: a new resource for evaluating local-level public health preparedness.

Urbanisation will be one of the defining demographic trends of the 21st century-creating unique opportunities for sustainable capacity development, as well as substantial risks and challenges for managing public health and health emergencies. Plans and policies for responding to public health emergencies are generally framed at higher levels of governance, but developing, improving and sustaining the capacities necessary for implementing these policies is a direct function of local-level authorities. Evaluating local-level public health capacities is an important process for identifying strengths and weaknesses that can impact the preparedness for, detection of and response to health security threats. However, while various evaluations and assessments exist for evaluating capacities at other levels, currently, there are no readily available health security assessments for the local-level. In this paper, we describe a tool-the Rapid Urban Health Security Assessment (RUHSA) Tool-that is based on a variety of other relevant assessments and guidance documents. Assessing capacities allow for local-level authorities to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their local health security systems, create multiyear action plans and prioritise opportunities for improving capacities, effectively engage with development partners to target resources effectively and develop compelling narratives and a legacy of leadership. While the RUHSA Tool was not designed to be used in the midst of a public health emergency, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it may also be adapted to inform a checklist for prioritising what capacities and activities a city needs to rapidly develop or to help focus requests for assistance.